Proposition 75, the so-called Paycheck Protection Act claims to protect union members from having their union dues used for political purposes they do not agree with.
This is bahloney on the Governor's part.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already upheld, repeatedly, that (a) unions (e.g., teacher's unions) cannot use member's dues for political purposes without prior consent, (b) members can withdraw consent at any time, thereby opting out of the unions using their dues for poltical purposes, and (c) if members opt out, the unions must provide a public accounting to prove they did not use those dues for political purposes.
If you don't believe me, ask the U.S. Supreme Court. Here are their decisons on the matter:
1. The U.S. Supreme Court, in International Association of Machinists v. Street, [367 U.S. 740 (1961)] found that such expenditures fall outside of the scope of reasons which justified union shop agreements.
2. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court in Railway Clerks v. Allen reaffirmed that, under Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, labor unions cannot, over an employee's objection, use exacted funds to support political activities which such employees oppose [373 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1963)].
3. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, extended Street and Allen to encompass dissenting non-union public employees [431 U.S. 209(1977)] basing its decision, however, on constitutional grounds that were not at issue in the prior cases. While a labor organization can constitutionally expend funds for the expression of political and ideological views which are not germane to its collective-bargaining activities, it can only finance such expenditures from the dues of non dissenting employees [Id., 235-36]. Dissenting, non-union employees have a constitutional First Amendment right to prevent a labor union from using a proportionate share of their service fees for certain political and ideological activities unrelated to the union's collective-bargaining activities. [Id., 234. Cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) in which the Supreme Court held that contributions to organizations for the purpose of spreading a political message were protected by the First Amendment.]
4. In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the Court was asked to determine the validity of a rebate scheme, in which a labor union collected dues from employees and used them for certain political and ideological activities, later paying a rebate to employees who dissented from the political and ideological use of such dues [466 U.S. 435 (1984)]. The Court noted that under the rebate scheme the union obtains an involuntary loan for those political and ideological activities to which the dissenting employees object [Id., 443]. Since there were readily available acceptable alternatives to such union borrowing, such as advance reduction of dues and/or interest bearing accounts, the Court found that a union cannot be allowed to use the dissenting employees' funds even temporarily.
5. Two years later, in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson [475 U.S. 292 (1986)] the Supreme Court held that the constitutional requirements for the union's collection of agency fees from non-members would include: (1) an adequate explanation for the basis of the fee; (2) a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial arbitrator; and (3) the establishment of an escrow fund for the amounts reasonably in dispute while any challenges are pending.
In addition, the Congress has current proposals under consideration would mostly codify the Supreme Court's decisions in Street, Abood, Ellis, Chicago Teachers Union, Beck, and Lehnert. These decisions have interpreted the NLRA and the RLA as restricting the use of compulsory union dues by labor organizations, providing for the disclosure of union expenditures, and notifying employees of their right not to join a union as a condition of employment (the payment of agency dues or fees would be required). However, the various proposals tend to go beyond the Court's interpretations of the statutes. One major difference, which appears in several bills, is the provision that prohibits labor organizations from collecting any dues or fees not related to collective bargaining, contract adminstration, or grievance adjustment unless the employee has agreed, in writing, to pay such dues or fees.
[Sources and text above gleaned and adopted from The Use Of Union Dues For Political Purposes: A Legal Analysis, by John Contrubis and Margaret Mikyung Lee, American Law Division, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS; Number 97-618. http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/ascii/97-618]
In short, repeated U.S. Supreme Court decisions have decisively demonstrated that CA Public Employee Union members and agency fee payers (a) can allow their union dues to be used for political purposes, (b) can opt out anytime at a later date if change their minds and do not want the union to use their dues for political purposes, and (c) must be clearly informed by the union of both (a) and (b) above.
So then what's the real purpose of Prop. 75? It sure isn't to provide union members with the right to keep unions from using our dues for purposes we disagree with, we've already had that right for decades.
This is bahloney on the Governor's part.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already upheld, repeatedly, that (a) unions (e.g., teacher's unions) cannot use member's dues for political purposes without prior consent, (b) members can withdraw consent at any time, thereby opting out of the unions using their dues for poltical purposes, and (c) if members opt out, the unions must provide a public accounting to prove they did not use those dues for political purposes.
If you don't believe me, ask the U.S. Supreme Court. Here are their decisons on the matter:
1. The U.S. Supreme Court, in International Association of Machinists v. Street, [367 U.S. 740 (1961)] found that such expenditures fall outside of the scope of reasons which justified union shop agreements.
2. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court in Railway Clerks v. Allen reaffirmed that, under Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, labor unions cannot, over an employee's objection, use exacted funds to support political activities which such employees oppose [373 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1963)].
3. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, extended Street and Allen to encompass dissenting non-union public employees [431 U.S. 209(1977)] basing its decision, however, on constitutional grounds that were not at issue in the prior cases. While a labor organization can constitutionally expend funds for the expression of political and ideological views which are not germane to its collective-bargaining activities, it can only finance such expenditures from the dues of non dissenting employees [Id., 235-36]. Dissenting, non-union employees have a constitutional First Amendment right to prevent a labor union from using a proportionate share of their service fees for certain political and ideological activities unrelated to the union's collective-bargaining activities. [Id., 234. Cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) in which the Supreme Court held that contributions to organizations for the purpose of spreading a political message were protected by the First Amendment.]
4. In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the Court was asked to determine the validity of a rebate scheme, in which a labor union collected dues from employees and used them for certain political and ideological activities, later paying a rebate to employees who dissented from the political and ideological use of such dues [466 U.S. 435 (1984)]. The Court noted that under the rebate scheme the union obtains an involuntary loan for those political and ideological activities to which the dissenting employees object [Id., 443]. Since there were readily available acceptable alternatives to such union borrowing, such as advance reduction of dues and/or interest bearing accounts, the Court found that a union cannot be allowed to use the dissenting employees' funds even temporarily.
5. Two years later, in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson [475 U.S. 292 (1986)] the Supreme Court held that the constitutional requirements for the union's collection of agency fees from non-members would include: (1) an adequate explanation for the basis of the fee; (2) a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial arbitrator; and (3) the establishment of an escrow fund for the amounts reasonably in dispute while any challenges are pending.
In addition, the Congress has current proposals under consideration would mostly codify the Supreme Court's decisions in Street, Abood, Ellis, Chicago Teachers Union, Beck, and Lehnert. These decisions have interpreted the NLRA and the RLA as restricting the use of compulsory union dues by labor organizations, providing for the disclosure of union expenditures, and notifying employees of their right not to join a union as a condition of employment (the payment of agency dues or fees would be required). However, the various proposals tend to go beyond the Court's interpretations of the statutes. One major difference, which appears in several bills, is the provision that prohibits labor organizations from collecting any dues or fees not related to collective bargaining, contract adminstration, or grievance adjustment unless the employee has agreed, in writing, to pay such dues or fees.
[Sources and text above gleaned and adopted from The Use Of Union Dues For Political Purposes: A Legal Analysis, by John Contrubis and Margaret Mikyung Lee, American Law Division, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS; Number 97-618. http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/ascii/97-618]
In short, repeated U.S. Supreme Court decisions have decisively demonstrated that CA Public Employee Union members and agency fee payers (a) can allow their union dues to be used for political purposes, (b) can opt out anytime at a later date if change their minds and do not want the union to use their dues for political purposes, and (c) must be clearly informed by the union of both (a) and (b) above.
So then what's the real purpose of Prop. 75? It sure isn't to provide union members with the right to keep unions from using our dues for purposes we disagree with, we've already had that right for decades.
6 comments:
There's a big difference between "opt out" and "opt in" - and you know that. Also, the cases you cite affect only non-public unions, therefore not applicable.
Both U.S. Supreme Court cases:
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
and
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson
are public employee unions.
Arnold's website, JoinArnold.com, claims:
Proposition 75, also known as "Paycheck Protection," gives workers the right to choose whether or not union dues money from their paychecks should be used for political purposes.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has already repeatedly decided this. Both public and private union members and agency fee payers can opt out anytime they wish.
They could, but the unions just lie about their spending, claiming that allowing full time staff members to work on campaigns on work time is union business, not campaigning. In most cases anyone who files to opt out will find themselves intimidated by thugs and only relieved of $2 to 3 a month in payments. The fraud by the unions in this area is widespread. The Dems in congress blcoked a plan to allow the DOL to investigate.
First, thank you for admitting you were wrong about the Supreme Court decisions only affecting private employee unions. The Court clearly covered both private and public employee unions.
Second, the Court clearly stipulated that the unions must account and prove they did not use union dues for political purposes against the dissenter's wishes. If someone, anyone, violates a Supreme Court decision (e.g., "they just lie about their spending"), it is cause for legal action in the courts.
It is not cause for a lie of a proposition, i.e., Proposition 75.
The Governor's website, JoinArnold.com claims, Proposition 75, also known as "Paycheck Protection," gives workers the right to choose whether or not union dues money from their paychecks should be used for political purposes. (Bold emphasis added.)
This of course is a bald-faced lie, as clearly demonstrated by the Court decisions.
If the unions allegedly "just lie about their spending" under a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Proposition 75 won't change it.
I say this not to give creedence to your claim, but to demonstrate the facetious nature of you claim.
In addition, you said "in most cases anyone who files to opt out will find themselves intimdated by thugs and only relieved of $2 to 3 a month in payments."
I completely opted out of the union and was not an agency fee payer for four years. My "dues" never went to the union, but went to the American Cancer Society. I never had a "thug" bother me once.
In addition, your statement above is an admission that we can already opt out. So why the lie of Prop. 75?
I find it fascinating that the Prop. 75 proponents initially say Prop. 75 gives workers the right to choose whether or not union dues money from their paychecks should be used for political purposes, yet when confronted with the facts, they change their story completely and their response (like yours) is invariably an admission that Prop. 75 is a fraud.
Why don't you just be honest about it and say something like the following, "We think the unions are really bad things for the following reaons (reasons listed here) and we want to cripple the unions. Hence, please vote for the following bill."
Don't you find it a little bit disturbing that you have to lie and deceive to get your proposition?
It is one thing to believe a lie, it is a whole other thing to know it's a lie and still try to believe it.
The Apostle Paul commented on this basic idea when he said,
Rom 1:18-23 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hinder the truth in unrighteousness; because that which is known of God is manifest in them; for God manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse: because that, knowing God, they glorified him not as God, neither gave thanks; but became vain in their reasonings, and their senseless heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.
In other words, they knew exactly who God is, and still chose to worship what they knew to be a lie anyway.
It's one thing to be wrong, it is a whole other thing to be wrong on purpose!
I smell ulterior motives on the part of the pro-75 lobby
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