Monday, October 31, 2005

Teacher Tenure -- CA Proposition 74

California Proposition 74, the teacher tenure initiative proposes to change the California education code (i.e., CA law) to make it easier to fire K-12 public school teachers.

It is being touted in California as a reform in that it claims teachers need to work for a full five years (as opposed to 2 years) before K-12 public school teacher supposedly get "tenure" and thereby have a "job for life" wherein K-12 public school teachers cannot be fired, even if they are unprofessional and poor teachers.

I am a public school teacher in So. Cal. and want to point out we do not get tenure. This is not just a play on words, but we actually do not get tenure.

The Governor claims that Prop. 74 is needed because (a) the school are under-performing in significant part because of bad teachers, and (b) bad teachers cannot be fired because they have "tenure."

There is no such thing as tenure for K-12 public school teachers. For the first two years of our employment, we are on temporary, probationary status where (a) we can be fired mid-year without cause, and (b) our contracts expire at the end of the year unless the school district chooses to re-hire us.

However, if we pass our evalutations for those two probationary years and we are re-hired, we then get permanent teacher status, which only means our contracts do not expire every year.

Once we get permanent status, public school teachers can be (and are) fired for the following reasons according to the California Education Code (i.e., CA law) section 44932:
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=edc&group=44001-45000&file=44930-44988

(1) Immoral or unprofessional conduct.

(2) Commission, aiding, or advocating the commission of acts of criminal syndicalism, as prohibited by Chapter 188 of the Statutes of 1919, or in any amendment thereof.

(3) Dishonesty.

(4) Unsatisfactory performance.

(5) Evident unfitness for service.

(6) Physical or mental condition unfitting him or her to instruct or associate with children.

(7) Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school, laws of the state, or reasonable regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools by the State Board of Education or by the governing board of the school district employing him or her.

(8) Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude.

(9) Violation of Section 51530 or conduct specified in Section 1028 of the Government Code, added by Chapter 1418 of the Statutes of 1947.

(10) Knowing membership by the employee in the Communist Party.

(11) Alcoholism or other drug abuse which makes the employee unfit to instruct or associate with children.

In addition, the only permanency we have to our positons is that, if we are to be fired, we are entitled to 90 days notice (cf. Ca Ed. Code section 44939) in which we are allowed to a hearing to determine whether such charges are actually true.

That's it. That's the sum total of teacher "tenure."

The Governor in proposition 74 wants to extend our propationary status from 2 years to 5 years, longer than any other civil servant, and then wants to remove our right to have a hearing before we are fired.

WHY?

Saturday, October 29, 2005

CA Proposition 75 Paycheck Protection Act, An Analysis

Proposition 75, the so-called Paycheck Protection Act claims to protect union members from having their union dues used for political purposes they do not agree with.

This is bahloney on the Governor's part.

The U.S. Supreme Court has already upheld, repeatedly, that (a) unions (e.g., teacher's unions) cannot use member's dues for political purposes without prior consent, (b) members can withdraw consent at any time, thereby opting out of the unions using their dues for poltical purposes, and (c) if members opt out, the unions must provide a public accounting to prove they did not use those dues for political purposes.

If you don't believe me, ask the U.S. Supreme Court. Here are their decisons on the matter:

1. The U.S. Supreme Court, in International Association of Machinists v. Street, [367 U.S. 740 (1961)] found that such expenditures fall outside of the scope of reasons which justified union shop agreements.

2. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court in Railway Clerks v. Allen reaffirmed that, under Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, labor unions cannot, over an employee's objection, use exacted funds to support political activities which such employees oppose [373 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1963)].

3. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, extended Street and Allen to encompass dissenting non-union public employees [431 U.S. 209(1977)] basing its decision, however, on constitutional grounds that were not at issue in the prior cases. While a labor organization can constitutionally expend funds for the expression of political and ideological views which are not germane to its collective-bargaining activities, it can only finance such expenditures from the dues of non dissenting employees [Id., 235-36]. Dissenting, non-union employees have a constitutional First Amendment right to prevent a labor union from using a proportionate share of their service fees for certain political and ideological activities unrelated to the union's collective-bargaining activities. [Id., 234. Cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) in which the Supreme Court held that contributions to organizations for the purpose of spreading a political message were protected by the First Amendment.]

4. In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the Court was asked to determine the validity of a rebate scheme, in which a labor union collected dues from employees and used them for certain political and ideological activities, later paying a rebate to employees who dissented from the political and ideological use of such dues [466 U.S. 435 (1984)]. The Court noted that under the rebate scheme the union obtains an involuntary loan for those political and ideological activities to which the dissenting employees object [Id., 443]. Since there were readily available acceptable alternatives to such union borrowing, such as advance reduction of dues and/or interest bearing accounts, the Court found that a union cannot be allowed to use the dissenting employees' funds even temporarily.

5. Two years later, in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson [475 U.S. 292 (1986)] the Supreme Court held that the constitutional requirements for the union's collection of agency fees from non-members would include: (1) an adequate explanation for the basis of the fee; (2) a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial arbitrator; and (3) the establishment of an escrow fund for the amounts reasonably in dispute while any challenges are pending.

In addition, the Congress has current proposals under consideration would mostly codify the Supreme Court's decisions in Street, Abood, Ellis, Chicago Teachers Union, Beck, and Lehnert. These decisions have interpreted the NLRA and the RLA as restricting the use of compulsory union dues by labor organizations, providing for the disclosure of union expenditures, and notifying employees of their right not to join a union as a condition of employment (the payment of agency dues or fees would be required). However, the various proposals tend to go beyond the Court's interpretations of the statutes. One major difference, which appears in several bills, is the provision that prohibits labor organizations from collecting any dues or fees not related to collective bargaining, contract adminstration, or grievance adjustment unless the employee has agreed, in writing, to pay such dues or fees.

[Sources and text above gleaned and adopted from The Use Of Union Dues For Political Purposes: A Legal Analysis, by John Contrubis and Margaret Mikyung Lee, American Law Division, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS; Number 97-618.
http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/ascii/97-618]

In short, repeated U.S. Supreme Court decisions have decisively demonstrated that CA Public Employee Union members and agency fee payers (a) can allow their union dues to be used for political purposes, (b) can opt out anytime at a later date if change their minds and do not want the union to use their dues for political purposes, and (c) must be clearly informed by the union of both (a) and (b) above.

So then what's the real purpose of Prop. 75? It sure isn't to provide union members with the right to keep unions from using our dues for purposes we disagree with, we've already had that right for decades.

Friday, October 21, 2005

Rock on Freedom Rock!


I got this pic in an email from a former high school student on mine (took my chemistry class) who is now graduating USC in Foreign Relations, or some such major.

The email he sent says the rock in the picture used to be a graffiti target all the time until it was painted by the artist seen here in the picture.

I hope I can get a few more of these pics posted here at it is a great piece of work. Rock On! God bless the men and women who risk their lives every day to keep me and my family safe. My brother is a firefighter/paramedic in Colorado. Every year I invite the USMC into my classroom to talk to my students. Wish I knew some better way to pay them back for protecting me.